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CHAPTER 8 
Corporations 
BERTRAM H. LOEWENBERG 
§8.1. Restrictions on transfer of stock. One of the paradoxes asso-
ciated with the modern corporation is its continued popularity as a 
business unit, notwithstanding the fact that some of the corporate 
attributes are often distasteful to the owners. Businessmen continue 
to adopt the corporate form because they seek limited liability or the 
acquisition of transferable interests, and then face the problem, in some 
instances at least, of alleviating the increased tax burdens resulting 
from incorporation.! A partnership is incorporated for what appears 
to be valid reasons, and the stockholders, unhappy with corporate pro-
cedure, often continue to conduct their business as though they were 
still partners. 
Perhaps the most common example of this desire to modify normal 
corporate characteristics is the restriction on the transfer of stock. 
Shareholders in a closely held corporation will almost inevitably insist 
that some form of restriction be imposed to prevent the introduction 
of new members into the enterprise without their consent. The va-
lidity of such restrictions is well established.2 In the typical case the 
stockholder is prohibited from transferring his shares without first 
offering them to the corporation at a price fixed by appraisal or by 
reference to some standard such as book value.3 
In a significant decision in 1954, Kentucky Package Store, Inc. v. 
Checani,4 such a restriction failed to accomplish its objective when the 
corporation sought to enforce it against the estate of the majority 
stockholder. Upon his decease the corporation was left with a board 
of four directors, which was deadlocked on the question as to whether 
the corporation should exercise its option to purchase the decedent's 
BERTRAM H. LOEWENBERG is a partner in the firm of Sherburne, Powers and Need-
ham, Boston. He is also a Lecturer in Law at Northeastern University School of 
Law. 
§8.l. 1 This is not intended to suggest that incorporation always results in in-
creased taxes, since frequently an over·aIl reduction in taxes is sought and achieved 
by the use of the corporate form. 
• Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. North Attleborough Chapter of the American 
Red Cross, 330 Mass. 114, 111 N.E.2d 447 (1953); see also C.L., c. 156, §6(f). 
3 Monotype Composition Co., Inc. v. Kiernan, 319 Mass. 456, 66 N.E.2d 565 (1946). 
• 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 135, 117 N.E.2d 139. 
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§7.12 WILLS, TRUSTS, ESTATE ADMINISTRATION 69 
equity proceeding (actions at law are forbidden) in the Probate Court 
without a time limit except that real estate of the testator is not reach-
able unless such proceeding is filed within twenty years after the testa-
tor's death. 
Chapter 478 of the Acts of 1954 amends Chapter 195, Section 11 of 
the General Laws by dispensing with the need for filing a separate peti-
tion for the appointment of a suitable person as executor or administra-
tor to succeed an unsuitable person removed under petition filed under 
said section. Similar provisions apply to the appointment of successor 
trustees 2 and successor guardians and conservators.3 
In another very helpful new law,4 temporary conservators are per-
mitted to function from the date of their appointment, thus eliminating 
an increasingly troublesome hiatus during the twenty-day period. 
Chapter 562 of the Acts of 1954, applying to estates of persons dying 
on or after June 3, 1954, provides an elaborate series of steps for settle-
ment by a "voluntary" administrator under an "informal" probate 
proceeding of an intestate estate not in excess of $500 and consisting 
entirely of personal property. 
2 G.L., c. 203, §12. 
8 G.L., c. 201, §33. 
'Acts of 1954, c. 330, amending G.L., c. 201, §21. 
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72 1954 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §8.2 
a case of first instance, Lewis v. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc.,! the Supreme 
Judicial Court upheld the validity of such a provision. 
The Lewis case is perhaps another example of the stockholders' 
tendency to rebel against normal corporate practice in a closely held 
enterprise. Although literally no restriction on transfer was involved, 
the same objective, namely, to control the identity of the stockholders, 
was sought. The challenged provision had been inserted by amend-
ments to the agreement of association and the articles of organization 
and stated that by unanimous vote of the full board of directors all or 
any part of the common stock held by a designated holder or holders 
could be called at any time at book value for purchase by the corpora-
tion or for retirement or cancellation in connection with any reduction 
of capital. All the stock, except for certain shares held by two charita-
ble trusts established by one of the officers, was owned by directors and 
executives of the corporation and their families, and it was apparent 
that the principal purpose of the callability provision was to keep the 
common stock in the hands of those closely connected with the manage-
ment of the business.2 The plaintiff was a director at the time the 
amendments were adopted and subsequently purchased additional 
shares subject to the same callability provision. 
Upon the plaintiff's voluntary retirement in 1951 he failed to follow 
the practice of other retiring executives and made no arrangements to 
sell his stock to the corporation or to other active stockholders. Subse-
quently the directors called approximately 40 percent of the stock 
owned by the plaintiff in the first exercise of the callability provision 
which had ever been made.s The plaintiff's bill to enjoin the corpora-
tion from enforcing the provisions was dismissed. 
Although the Court agreed with the plaintiff's contention that de-
cisions upholding restrictions on transfer were not completely perti-
nent, some reliance was placed on precedents in that are... An agree-
ment under which an employee upon terminating his employment had 
to offer his stock to the corporation, which was obligated to purchase it 
at book value, had been approved a few years earlier in Winchell v. 
Plywood Corp.4 Actually, the only practical difference between the 
situations in the Winchell and Lewis cases was that in the former the 
stock would have been called automatically upon termination of em-
ployment; in Lewis the restriction made no reference to employment, 
so that the directors had to take affirmative action to acquire the shares 
of the retired employee. 
Since the challenged provision was not literally keyed to the termina-
tion of employment, however, the plaintiff was able to contend that it 
destroyed "the independence of stockholders," placed them "at the 
§8.2. 1 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 769, 121 N.E.2d 850. 
• 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 771, 121 N.E.2d at 851-852. 
• The trial judge found that the directors in calling the plaintiff's stock acted in 
good faith, a finding on which the Court placed considerable emphasis. 1954 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. at 774, 121 N.E.2d at 853. 
• 324 Mass. 171,85 N.E.2d 313 (1949). 
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§8.2 CORPORATIONS 71 
stock. The corporation brought suit to prevent the decedent's adminis-
tratrix from transferring the shares and to restrain her from voting on 
the question of exercising the option. The Court held that the ad-
ministratrix could not be disenfranchised from voting her shares on 
this issue. 
The effect of the ChEfflni decision appears to be that a majority stock-
holder can defeat a restriction on the transfer of his stock by voting his 
shares against their purchase by the corporation. Normally. the stock 
is offered to the corporation through the directors. but if a majority 
of the board is susceptible to the wishes of the principal stockholder, 
the same result would follow. Conceivably. if the stockholder was a 
member of the board. he might be disqualified from voting on the 
ground of personal interest.5 However. unless a majority of the re-
maining directors were independent of the controlling stockholder. his 
desires would in all likelihood be followed; and if a deadlock resulted 
as in the Checani case. the matter would be resolved by the stock-
holders.6 A stockholder. unlike a director, is normally not under any 
fidl!~~a!y restraint and can vote on matters in which he has a personal 
stake.7 
The Checani decision has been criticized for permitting an apparent 
circumvention of the restriction on transfer.s The suggestion is made 
that by consenting to the restrictions a stockholder impliedly contracts 
not to vote his shares against the exercise of the option.9 Techniques 
to avoid the Checani result, principally the drafting of appropriate 
language in the restrictions. have been offered,lo Whether this criti-
cism is warranted. however, is far from clear. A majority stockholder 
may intend to use the restriction to prevent the transfer of minority in-
terests to undesirable associates. But it does not follow that he expects 
to surrender one of his prerogatives of control and permit the minority 
to dictate to him what he may do with his stock. Certainly, where one 
individual owns substantially all the outstanding stock, the tail would 
be wagging the dog if the minority could prevent a transfer of the 
shares. 
§8.2. The callability of common stock. The very title of this section 
appears to be self-contradictory. since a provision by which common 
stock can be called for retirement by the directors seems at first glance 
to be incompatible with the inherent nature of common stock. Yet in 
!4)luffy v. Omaha Merchants' Express & Transfer Co., 127 Neb. 273. 255 N.W. 1 
(1934); see Federal Mortgage Co. v. Simes, 210 Wis. 139. 150. 245 N.W. 169. 173 
(1932); Ballantine, Corporations §68 (rev. ed. 1946). 
• See United Hotels Co. of America, Inc. v. Mealey. 147 F.2d 816. 818. 819 (2d Cir. 
1945); Ballantine, id. §71. 
7 Bjorngaard v. Goodhue County Bank, 49 Minn. 483. 52 N.W. 48 (1892); Gamble 
v. Queens County Water Co., 123 N.Y. 91. 25 N.E. 201 (1890); Ballantine. id. §71. 
8 Note. 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1422 (1954); Dimond. Significant Decisions of the Supreme 
Judicial Court During Its 1953-1954 Sitting, 39 Mass. L.Q .• No.3, pp. 51, 60 
(1954). 
• Note, 67 Harv. L. Rev. at 1423 (1954); Dimond, id. at 62. 
,. Dimond, id. at 61·63. 
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mercy of directors," and "cut through all the basic attributes of com-
mon stock ownership." 5 The Court rejected this contention and con-
cluded that although the provisions "go very far," 6 they represented a 
contract made by the plaintiff with his eyes open and were "not con-
trary to the corporation laws of the Commonwealth nor to public 
policy." 7 
Two decisions can hardly be said to represent a trend. If the Checani 
case permitted the objectives of a restriction on transfer to be thwarted, 
it certainly did not indicate any hostility on the part of the Court to 
this type of device. And by approving the callability provision in the 
Lewis decision the Court demonstrated its willingness to permit stock-
holders of a closely held corporation in pursuit of a legitimate objective 
to modify drastically a traditional corporate concept. 
§8.3. Directors' fiduciary duty; Validity of bonuses. Hardly a year 
passes during which the Supreme Judicial Court is not faced with the 
problem of re·examining the fiduciary duty owed by directors and 
applying it to the facts of a particular case.! The current year was no 
exception, and the case was Beacon Wool Corp. v. Johnson.2 
Because directors are normally permitted to fix their own compensa-
tion despite the obvious conflict of interest involved,3 the courts have 
established rigid standards of good faith which the board must exercise 
in this situation.4 Therefore, the decision in the Johnson case was, in 
part at least, not surprising. The Court required two surviving direc-
tors to repay bonuses voted to themselves after the death of the sole 
stockholder, who had dictated the entire policy of the company and 
whose demise, as the directors knew, threatened the continuation of the 
business. 
The noteworthy element in the Johnson decision, however, was the 
ruling that the directors were also liable for bonuses they authorized 
for clerical employees after the death of the stockholder. Such bonuses, 
of course, are normally free from attack on fiduciary grounds, since 
there is no conflict of interest involved. Under the circumstances, how-
ever, the Court found that the directors' action was "a misuse of . . . 
authority amounting to lack of good faith." 5 
§8.4. Sale or transfer of assets and liquidation: Statutory changes. 
A reminder that all the statutory provisions pertaining to Massachusetts 
business corporations are not located in Chapters 155 and 156 of the 
• 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 772. 121 N.E.2d at 852. 
• Ibid. 
• 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 776. 121 N.E.2d at 854. 
§8.3. 1 See. for example. Black v. Parker Manufacturing Co .• 329 Mass. 105. 106 
N.E.2d 544 (1952); Production Machine Co. v. Howe. 327 Mass. 372. 99 N.E.2d 32 
(1951). 
• 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 411. 119 N.E.2d 195. 
• Meyer v. Fort Hill Engraving Co .• 249 Mass. 302. 143 N.E. 915 (1924); Fillebrown 
v. Hayward. 190 Mass. 472. 77 N.E. 45 (1906). 
• Sagalyn v. Meekins. Packard & Wheat. Inc .• 290 Mass. 434. 195 N.E. 769 (1935); 
Ballantine, Corporations §76 (rev. ed. 1946). 
51954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 411, 416, 119 N.E.2d 195, 199. 
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General Laws is found in Chapter 461 of the Acts of 1954.1 This enact-
ment amended an important and frequently overlooked statute 2 which 
required a corporation to notify the Commissioner of Corporations and 
Taxation of any sale or transfer of all or any part of its assets, otherwise 
than in the ordinary course of business, at least five days prior to the 
transaction. The notice was to contain the terms and conditions of 
the sale or transfer as well as the location and character of the assets. 
Failure to give such notice made the transfer fraudulent and void as 
against the Commonwealth.3 
The statute was, of course, designed to protect the Commonwealth's 
claim to unpaid corporation excise taxes. The 1954 amendment nar-
rowed the scope of the act by making it applicable only where all or 
substantially all the corporate assets were involved, but in other respects 
the law was strengthened and clarified. In addition to filing the notice 
the corporation must now file corporation excise tax returns, including 
a return for the period ending with the date of the transfer, and pay 
the taxes shown on the returns at or before the time of the transfer. 
Failure to comply with these requirements does not invalidate the trans-
fer as was provided in the original statute but instead gives the Com-
monwealth a lien for its exclusive benefit 4 upon all the corporate assets 
for a period of three years to the extent necessary to satisfy the unpaid 
taxes. The Commissioner may, however, issue a written waiver of the 
lien and the other statutory requirements either before or after the 
transfer. Since the waiver may be recorded in the appropriate registry 
of deeds or city or town clerk's office, the purchaser or other transferee 
is now given a method of satisfying himself that the lien does not exist. 
Sales or transfers by receivers, trustees in bankruptcy, and similar 
officials are exempted from the provisions of the statute as are mortgages 
and pledges given for obligations incurred in good faith.5 Although 
transfers in liquidation are not specifically mentioned,6 it seems desir-
able, at least where real estate is involved, to obtain and record the 
waiver of lien now provided for by the amendment. 
§8.4. 1 The act took effect on September 1, 1954, but Section 3 governs certain 
transactions which occurred prior to that date. 
• G.L., c. 63, §76. 
• Attempts have been made by trustees in bankruptcy proceedings to step into the 
shoes of the Commonwealth and set aside transfers made in violation of this statute 
pursuant to the provisions of Section 70(e)(1) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §110 
(1952). There appear to be no reported court decisions, however, in which the 
validity of such a proceeding has been adjudicated. 
• The phrase "for its exclusive benefit" would seem to weaken the standing of a 
trustee in bankruptcy to invoke the act. See note 3 supra. 
• The original act was silent with respect to transfers made as security for the 
performance of obligations, so that such transactions were presumably not exempt. 
• Where liquidation is followed by the corporation'S request for dissolution under 
G.L., c. 155, §50A, the Commonwealth's interest in unpaid corporation excise taxes 
is protected by the personal assumption of tax liabilities which the officers and di-
rectors undertake in executing the required Form 355D. Where complete liquida-
tion is not followed by dissolution, however, the transfer of the assets appears to 
require compliance with the statute. 
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§8.5. Closing stock transfer books or establishing record date: 
Statutory changes. Prior to 1953 no statutory authority existed for a 
Massachusetts corporation to close its stock transfer books or to estab-
lish a record date for the purpose of determining the list of stockholders 
entitled to vote at a meeting or to receive a dividend or other distribu-
tion. Despite this lack of legislative sanction it is likely that many 
corporations used one of these methods to establish its list of eligible 
stockholders. The legislature in its 1953 session 1 validated this prac-
tice by giving the board of directors the right to close the transfer books 
or to establish a record date not more than thirty days 2 before the date 
of the meeting or the date for the payment of the dividend or other 
distribution. In 1954 the new act was amended 3 to enlarge the period 
to sixty days, unless a shorter period is provided for in the agreement of 
association, the articles of organization, or the by-laws. 
§8.5. 1 Acts of 1953, c. 185, amending C.L., c. 155, §22. 
2 Unless otherwise provided in the agreement of association, articles of organiza-
tion, or the by-laws. The ambiguous nature of this proviso, which might have per-
mitted the board to enlarge the thirty-day period as it saw fit, probably led to the 
1954 amendment. 
• Acts of 1954, c. 50. 
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